I. INTRODUCTION
On behalf of the unanimous United States Supreme Court in Damon v. Territory of Hawaii, the esteemed Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote the following statement about a claim based on Hawaiian custom and usage:
A right of this sort is somewhat different from those familiar to the common law, but it seems to be well known to Hawaii, and, if it is established,....
[t]he plaintiff's claim is not to be approached as if it were something anomalous or monstrous, difficult to conceive and more difficult to admit.'
In Branca v. Makuakane, the Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawaii similarly acknowledged that:
The New Englanders who early settled here did not come as a colony or take possession of these islands or bring their body of laws with them, though they exercised a potent influence upon the growth of law and government. The ancient laws of the Hawaiians were gradually displaced, modified and added to. The common law was not formally adopted until 1893 [sic] and then subject to judicial precedents and Hawaiian national usage. 2 194 U.S. 154, 158 (1904) (reversing verdict for defendant and recognizing vested right to fishery abutting private property in action to quiet title brought within two year period required under provision of the Organic Act that confers exclusive fishing rights subject to vested rights); see also Carter v. Territory of Hawaii, 200 U.S. 255 (1906) (repeating the holding of Damon v. Territory of Hawaii, notwithstanding absence of any description of the fishery in royal land patent covering the abutting land).
2 13 Haw. 499, 504-05 (1901) (emphasis added) (vacating judgment for the defendants in a quiet title action concerning interpretation of a 1886 Hawaiian language deed, based on conclusion that the deed was clearly intended to convey fee simple title, and despite technical common law requirement to use the word "heirs" in order to accomplish such intent); see also O'Brien v. Walker, 35 Haw. 104, 131 n.18 (1939); Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Co. v. Wailuku Sugar Co., 15 Haw. 675,680-81 (1904) ; In re Guardianship of Parker, 14 Haw. 347, 350 (1902); Mossman v. Hawaiian Gov't, 10 Haw. 421, 434 (1896) ; In re Boundaries ofIt is clear from the historical events that led to statehood that protecting the special rights and claims of the Native Hawaiian People was an integral part of the statehood package and was an essential underpinning for the support that the Native Hawaiians gave to statehood....
In other words, Hawai'i would not have become a state if the people of Hawai'i had not agreed by vote to the requirement that the revenues from the Ceded Lands be used, in part, for "the betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians."
... It is significant that Congress reviewed this language [i.e., drafts of earlier statehood bills accepting any conditions of trust that Congress might put on the Public Lands transferred to the State of Hawai'i] (and the rest of the 1950 Constitution, which also accepted responsibility for administering the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920) and stated explicitly in Section 1 of the 1959 Admission Act that Hawai'i's Constitution "is hereby found to be republican inform and in conformity with the Constitution of the United States and the principles of the Declaration of Independence, and is hereby accepted, ratified, and confirmed."' 2
The express reference to "the betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians" appears in Section 5(t) of the Admission Act. 675-76, 658 P.2d 287, 310-11 (1982) ; State v. Zimring, 58 Haw. 106, 115-18, 566 P.2d 725, 731-33 (1977) ; County of Haw. v. Sotomura, 55 Haw. 176, 183, 517 P.2d 57, 62 (1973) ; State v. Zimring, 52 Haw. 472, 474-75, 479 P.2d 202, 204 (1970) ; In re Ashford, 50 Haw. 314, 315-16, 440 P.2d 76, 77-78 (1968); DeFreitas v. Coke, 46 Haw. 425, 429-30, 380 P.2d 762, 765-66 (1963) .
JON M. VAN DYKE, WHO OWNS THE CROWN LANDS OF HAwAI'I?, 302-03 (2006) (emphasis added).
It cannot be doubted, therefore, that the State and the Federal Government entered into a bilateral compact regarding the revenues from these lands and that an essential part of that compact was that the State would transfer part of the revenues from these lands to the Native Hawaiian people in order to resolve, in part, the claims that Native Hawaiians have regarding these lands. Congress required the State and its people to agree to use lands and revenues for the Native Hawaiian People because of its recognition of the claims of the Native Hawaiian people and the need to make progress in resolving these claims. Id. at 305; see also Eric Steven O'Malley, Irreconcilable Rights and the Question of Hawaiian Statehood, 89 GEo. L.J. 501,535 (2001) ("If OHA violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, does not the state constitution that led to its creation also violate Equal Protection?").
"3 Admission Act, § 5(f). In Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) , the Court abrogated the "equal footing" aspect of its prior decision in Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896), but reaffirmed the opinion to the extent it called for an inquiry into whether Congress intended for the prior rights of indigenous peoples to survive statehood. 526 U.S. at 176-85, 188-200,201-02,206-08 (distinguishing the Minnesota Admission Act's silence with respect to Indian treaty rights based upon close examination of the historical context).
Compare Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, with Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 2008 / CONTEXTUALIZING HAWAIIAN CUSTOM AND USAGE 325 further basis for understanding Native Hawaiians' ongoing claims for justice, which stem "from the racial and cultural subordination inherent in their colonization and the longstanding assault on their sovereignty."'" Native Hawaiians may indeed constitute a "discrete and insular minority" 2 2 consistent with the doctrine discussed in greater detail by other symposium participants. However, in light of: (1) Ruv. 163 (2004) . 23 United States District Court Judge Harold Fong decried the "absurdity" of claims by a group of property owners, including the Bishop Estate, that the group constituted "'discrete and insular minorities' who deserve special judicial protection because they lack access to the political system." Small Landowners of Oahu v. City & County of Honolulu, 832 F. Supp. 1404 , 1409 (D. Haw. 1993 ) (upholding city ordinance providing for lease-to-fee conversion of condominium units). Judge Fong explained that the "power of the Bishop Estate in Hawaii belies any claim that it lacks access to the political system." Id. (emphasis added).
In addition, United States District Judge David Alan Ezra cited Carolene Products to support his ruling against a class of visually impaired persons who use guide dogs seeking exemption from a 120-day quarantine requirement, based on the state's compelling interest in remaining rabies free. Crowder v. Kitagawa, 842 F. Supp. 1257 , 1263 (D. Haw. 1993 2-See Gilman, supra note 22, at 240-41 ("[Olnce a group is protected, it remains a protected class until the courts are willing to say that it is no longer suspect."). Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) ("We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today."), with The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (invalidating 1875 Civil Rights Act a mere eight years after its enactment). In The Civil Rights Cases, the United States Supreme Court stated as follows:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protected. 27 HAW. REv. STAT. § 1-1 (1993); see also supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text. In PASH/Kohanaiki, the Hawai'i Supreme Court applied Hawaiian custom and usage to "conclude that the western concept of exclusivity is not universally applicable in Hawai'i." 79 Hawai'i 425, 438-47, 903 P.2d 1246 , 1259 -68 (1995 Hawai'i Law Review / Vol. 30:319 decision, as distinguished from the (at least unconsciously) 33 racist attitudes that are sometimes couched in "color-blind" rhetoric. 4 Finally, the article closes in Part VI by suggesting that some of the "hardest questions about law and social justice" 3 5 associated with Native Hawaiian claims (as well as counterarguments raised by their opponents) may best be addressed by looking to the Hawaiian usage exception as a means for protecting cultural values and resources. REv. 557,557 (2007) .
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PLACING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
36 958 F.2d 1450 958 F.2d (9th Cir. 1992 . Under a Trusteeship Agreement entered into with the United Nations in 1947, the United States obligated itself to promote independence and selfgovernment for the Northern Marianas islands' inhabitants, to protect against the loss of lands and resources, and to "protect the rights and fundamental freedoms of all elements of the population without discrimination." Id. at 1458 (emphasis added) (quoting Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, art. VI, § § 2-3, July 18, 1947, 61 Stat. 3301); see also id. at 1459 n. 15 (observing that the non-native lessee did not argue violation of this non-discrimination provision).
international sense. ' 37 In the course of resolving this question of first impression, the Wabol court observed that extension of fundamental rights to the territories does not mean that strict scrutiny automatically applies. 38 Rather, judicial inquiries in this area must be undertaken with due regard for the "unique social and cultural conditions and values" of the place. 39 Thus, in Wabol, a "solid understanding of present conditions" ' revealed both the scarce and precious nature of land and the vital role it played in family identity. 4 The relevant legal history further established that the political union between the Northern Marianas Islands and the United States could not have been accomplished without the challenged policy. 4 2 Similar considerations arguably apply in Hawai'i."
Although Hawai'i is no longer a territory, the analysis in Wabol arguably retains relevance here due to the fact that these islands were listed on the United Nations' list of non-self governing territories (from 1946 through 1959) ," along with the other Pacific Island territories: 45 31 Id. at 1460 (second emphasis added); see also id. (distinguishing fundamental rights necessary under "an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty" pursuant to the Equal Protection clause, from fundamental rights under the territory clause which are "the basis of all free government" in the "international sense") (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968), and Northern Mariana Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682, 690 (9th Cir. 1984) ).
38 Id. at 1460 n. 19 ("It is the specific right of equality that must be considered.., rather than the broad general guarantee of equal protection."). 39 Id. at 1460.
4o Id. at 1461 (internal brackets omitted).
41 Id. 42 Id. (stressing further that, "the preservation of local culture and land is more than mere desideratum-it is a solemn and binding undertaking memorialized in the Trusteeship Agreement"); see also id. at 1458 (summarizing the United States' obligations as trustee), Fifteen years after the lawsuit began, the matter was still pending before the trial court as of at REv. 337, 386-88 (1991) ).
47 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res 61/295, at art. 14(1) (Sept. 13,2007) , availableathttp://www.un.orglesasodev/unpfiilendrip.html. Although the United States joined Australia, Canada, and New Zealand in registering the only four negative votes (143-4-11), our federal government nevertheless argued that it promotes the autonomy of its indigenous peoples regarding inherent powers of self-government including . Judge Ezra concluded that the evidence did not establish that Brayden's mother committed "subterfuge," nor that she intended to perpetuate the schools' reliance on inaccurate information. Id. at 10-11. He added that Kamehameha Schools should have completed its investigation more than three weeks before Plaintiff was to matriculate, and that rescinding his acceptance two days before he was to board an airplane to attend the orientation was simply too late. Id. at 11; see also id. at 13 (observing that Plaintiff had already "missed almost three weeks" of public school "and likely lost the opportunity to participate in other activities because of his reliance on his admission to [Kamehameha Schools]"); id. at 16 (stressing the "unique factual circumstances" including the "overall disruption" to Plaintiff's "emotional, academic, and social well-being"). r Id. Judge Ezra appears to have relied upon the following excerpt from In re Farrington: "The two types of children taken by foster parents were the keiki hanai, who were not truly adopted but merely reared in the home, and the keiki hookama, the latter being regarded the same as actual children of the blood." 42 Haw. 640,650 (1958 University of Hawai'i Law Review / Vol. 30:319 No less than a day after this announcement, at least one effort commenced to solicit plaintiffs for a future lawsuit challenging Kamehameha Schools' admissions policy. 72 Honolulu attorney David Rosen explained that his opposition to the policy stemmed from "concern about the misuse of race and origin in Hawaii" including claims for "'entitlements' based on events that occurred during the time of our great-grandparents or their great-grandparents. ' 321 (1992) ("History must be more than a simple telling of a story. Our ancestors recounted histories to learn valuable lessons from wise decisions or foolish mistakes made in the past, in order that the hewa or 'wrong' might never be repeated again."). 76 Viotti & Gordon, supra note 32; see also supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text. 7 Viotti & Gordon, supra note 32. I Id. Dr. Kekuni Blaisdell, a prominent Hawaiian sovereignty activist and Kamehameha Schools graduate, stated that Mohica-Cummings has no hanai claim but agreed that it would have been harmful to take Mohica-Cummings out of school out after he had already been accepted. Id. Although Blaisdell's biological daughter is also a graduate, he did not seek admission for his own Japanese-born hinai son because he lacked Hawaiian ancestry. Id.
" Id. According to Patience Namaka'Bacon, Hawaiian language expert and Bishop Museum cultural specialist (also, hfnai daughter of the late Hawaiian scholar Mary Kawena Pukui-to whom Kamehameha Schools said that Hawaiian ancestry is required in response to her request that Pat be admitted), the term hinai means the adoption of an infant or very young child, whereas ho'okama refers to the adoption of an adult or older child no longer needing nurturing. Id.
University of Hawai'i Law Review / Vol. 30:319
Indeed, Hawaiian usage and customs continue to be an integral part of the law, history and society of these islands. 80 However, the divergent views expressed immediately following Judge Ezra's oral ruling reveal the need for further inquiry and analysis.
A. Judicial Recognition of the Hawaiian Custom and Usage of Adoptions,
Including the Distinct Rights of Keiki Hdnai and Keiki Ho'okama Almost two decades prior to In re Farrington,"' the Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawaii decided the "Mamo Clark case, ' 8 2 which contained a more thorough discussion of the distinction between keiki h inai and keiki ho'okama. Looking to Hawaiian dictionaries published in 1836, 1865 and 1887, the O'Brien v. Walker court explained that "e hookama" means to "adopt" while "keiki hanai" simply means "a foster child or a ward." 3 The court then looked to Hawaiian customs and usage in an effort to ascertain the intent behind the term "lawful issue" in an 1896 deed of trust.
84
The trust provided in pertinent part that, upon the death of the last of John A. Cummins' four surviving children, his estate and all its property would be distributed to the lawful issue of his children. 5 Cummins died in January 1913; his last surviving child died in November 1937.6 The trustee for the estate then sought instructions whether to include Mamo Clark in the distribution of trust assets because she had been adopted (as an infant) by one of Cummins' daughters in December 1914.87 Absent any indication of Cummins' intent within the trust document itself, 8 the court looked to the surrounding circumstances of his life beginning near "the close of the era of unwritten law ending in 1841 and therefore nurtured Id. at 105, 107 . In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Coke argued that there had never before been an adoption in the Cummins family, and that his daughter did not adopt Mamo Clark until almost "twenty years after he had executed his deed and in fact not until after his death." Id. at 142, 145 (Coke, C.J., dissenting in part).
u Id. at 127.
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by a generation reverently familiar with the ancient Hawaiian customs and usage of adoptions as the law of the land." 89 The court further acknowledged the genealogical traditions of these islands, 90 noting Cummins' background both as an ali'i descendant as well as his service in both legislative and administrative positions under the monarchy, 9 ' which led to a presumption of his awareness of decisions by the Supreme Court of the Kingdom of Hawai'i recognizing the ancient Hawaiian custom and usage of adoptions.
92
Thus, the O'Brien court harmonized Cummins' unstated intent with Hawaiian usage rather than applying "the reverse blood-preference presumption of the less familiar and more distantly removed common law of England. 9 3 According to custom, Mamo Clark became the "lawful issue" of Cummins' daughter upon her lawful adoption (i.e., as keiki ho'okama), and therefore entitled to a rightful share in the trust estate. 94 Indeed, keiki hinai and keiki ho'okama did not enjoy the same legal protections under kingdom law. For example, keiki hinai did not have a right of inheritance pursuant to the first written laws of the kingdom." However, " Id.; see also id. at 129 (observing that at the time Cummins executed his trust deed in 1896, he "had lived all of his natural life.., in an atmosphere where adopted children were known by the people and considered blood children").
o Id. at 127 (stating "[ilt is also reasonable that he absorbed the atmosphere of this generation and that knowledge thereof was imparted to him according to the habit of Hawaiians to relay from one generation to another their folklore and pedigrees").
" ' Id. at (1871), then contends that he could "find no basis whatsoever for the statement made and reiterated in the opinion of the majority of this court 'that there were ancient customs (or usage) of adoptions which made an adopted child into one's own or blood child."' Id. at 140 (Coke, C.J., dissenting in part) (distinguishing other cases discussed by the majority on the unconvincing ground that they involved circumstances of intestacy as opposed to testamentary intent); see also infra note 97 and accompanying text (quoting O'Brien Thus, absent a will to the contrary, Kahanu prevailed over all other claimants 9 " as keiki ho'okama to his mother pursuant to Hawaiian custom and usage. be transferred."'); 3 Haw. at 348 ("The law of 1846 provides how adoptions may be legalized, and so do the laws now in force... although the specific term is not used in the law of descents.").
Thus, the question becomes whether a particular type of Hawaiian usage has been expressly abrogated by statute because "[t]he 1839 Declaration of Rights, which was incorporated into the 1840 Constitution, provided that 'nothing whatever shall be taken from any individual except by express provision of the laws."' Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. County Planning Comm'n (PASH/Kohanaiki), 79 Hawai'i 425, 443, 903 P.2d 1246, 1264 (1995) (citing LORRIN A. THuRSTON, FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HAWAI 1 (1904) and Kekiekie v. Dennis, I Haw. 42, 43 (1851)); see also Forman & Knight, supra note 27, at 8-13 (relying on the principle of constitutional narrowing, inter alia, to support the conclusion that Oni v. Meek, 2 Haw. 87 (1858), did not recognize the abolishment of an entire body of custom under the Kuleana Act of 1850 by simply rejecting a particular claim based upon a non-traditional practice, which had not achieved customary status in the area where the right was being asserted).
3 Haw. 368 (1871), cited with approval in O'Brien, 35 Haw. at 118 n.7. I Id. at 368 (emphasis added).
98 In addition to Kiaiaina (i.e., Kahanu's stepsister) and her husband, these claimants included at least Loe (Kahanu's great-aunt) and Kaawalauole (Kahanu's second cousin), if not also Kahoinea (Kahanu's stepfather) . See id.
B. Case-By-Case Analysis of Hawaiian Usage: The Tortured Resolution of Kaaoaopa 's Claim to Her Adoptive Mother's Estate
The Kiaiaina court's invocation of "Keahi, appellant, vs. Kaaoaopa, appellee" presumably referred to the parties in In re Estate of Nakuapa (Nakuapa I)." Although the decedent's cousin Keahi eventually prevailed over the decedent's adopted daughter Kaaoaopa in the latter dispute,"°° both the Chief Justice' and Second Associate Justice Widemann°2 expressly acknowledged the existence of a Hawaiian custom and usage of adoption prior to the kingdom's first written laws. For his part, First Associate Justice Hartwell acknowledged the "well known fact that agreements of this kind were once common among the natives of this kingdom,"' ' 3 but dissented based upon his belief that this practice had been repealed by implication as "inconsistent with the present Hawaiian statute of descents." '10 4 While sitting in probate, Chief Justice Allen rejected Kaaoaopa's claim; however, on appeal, a jury subsequently determined she was keiki h'nai to Nakuapa.°5 Justice Widemann later joined the Chief Justice in setting aside S3 Haw. 342 (1872) . 100 Id. at 342. Making her appearance to contest a petition by Nakuapa's cousin Keahi (who sought Letters of Administration for the estate), Kaaoaopa alleged that Nakuapa adopted her by verbal agreement before the.law required such adoptions to be performed in writing.
101 Id. at 343 (adding that "it is necessary that the relation should be clearly defined by competent evidence in relation to the precise terms of the original contract"); id. at 347 (emphasizing that such intent must be "clearly defined in the contract, by which the child adopted might be an heir to the property of the adopter").
"02 Id. at 348 (stating that "[t]he adoption of a child as heir, clearly and definitely made according to Hawaiian custom and usages prior to the written law, I hold to be valid under existing laws"). 103 Id. at 349. 104 Id. at 351; see also id. at 354-55 ("I am compelled to deny the power of this Court to read this statute according to native ideas and usages which prevailed before the establishment of the present system of government, and which are inconsistent with the simple, unambiguous and consistent meaning of the entire wording of the statute."). Justice Hartwell initially argued that absent a claim concerning a will, "adoption of an heir by ancient custom is not triable by jury" under the statute providing for jury trials in probate appeals. Id. at 349; see also O'Brien v. Walker, 35 Haw. 104, 138 (1939) (Coke, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the majority failed "to distinguish between an estate of intestacy which is controlled by the statutes of descent and distribution and an estate created by a trust deed in which event the intent of the trustor, as expressed in the trust document, must prevair) (emphasis added).
'ao Nakuapa 1, 3 Haw. at 342. The ali'i Puhalahua adopted Kaaoaopa as his child in 1827 or 1828 prior to marrying his former servant Nakuapa (who later joined in the adoption). See Estate of Nakuapa (Nakuapa 111), 3 Haw. 410,414 (1873) (Widemann, J.). Kaaoaopa lived with her adoptive parents until they died. Id. Puhalahua died in 1866, leaving his entire estate to Nakuapa by will dated 1854. Id. at 414-15; In re Estate of Nakuapa (Nakuapa I), 3 Haw. 400, 402 (1872) (Hartwell, J., dissenting) (stating "[h]e died testate, devising his property to his widow, Nakuapa"). Although the evidence established that Nakuapa had conversed with her the verdict and remanding for a new trial, explaining that the jury's verdict was not responsive to the question whether Kaaoaopa was adopted as an heir (i.e., as a keiki ho'okama).'°6 As Judge Ezra correctly noted,' 0 7 the Kingdom's highest court previously recognized adoption as "a sacred relation" to Hawaiians, "having all the rights, duties and obligations of a child of the blood."' 08 However, the general custom more specifically distinguished between the rights afforded to keiki hinai and keiki ho'okama:
Some were mere foster children, taken to nurse and to exercise a parental care over, and for a temporary purpose; others were adopted as one's own children to be cared for, to live with the adopter as such ....
... The Court is fully aware that children often lived under the charge of those acting in the relation of parents, so far as food and clothing were concerned, who
were not entitled to inheritance.'°9
Thus, the precise nature and scope of Hawaiian custom and usage depends upon the particular circumstances of each case. 1 0 attorney about making a will (without specifically naming Kaaoaopa as intended devisee), when he finally arrived at the house Nakuapa was too weak to act and died intestate in 1869. Nakuapa IIl, 3 Haw. at 414.
" Nakuapa 1, 3 Haw. at 348 (stating "the evidence as to the right of the keiki hanai to inherit, is somewhat conflicting, and the Court are [sic] uncertain what the intention of the jury was in rendering the verdict, by the terms used"); see also id. (Widemann, J., concurring) ("[Ais far as the verdict of the jury is clearly not responsive to this issue, a new trial should be granted.").
107 Viotti & Gordon, supra note 32 ("Quoting from a 1958 state Supreme Court decision that in turn invoked 'kingdom law,' Ezra cited two kinds of Hawaiian adoption, which he called a 'sacred relationship': keiki hanai and keiki hookama.") (emphasis added).
o Nakuapa 1, 3 Haw. at 347. 'o Id. at 343. A similar misinterpretation of Kingdom of Hawaii precedent-namely, Brunz v. Smith, 3 Haw. 783 (1877) -also took place in Pai 'Ohana v. United States, 875 F. Supp. 680 (D. Haw. 1995 ), affid, 76 F.3d 280 (9th Cir. 1996 . See Forman & Knight, supra note 27, at 15 ("The federal court's rationale not only merges-and thereby loses-the unique historical difference between occupancy and non-exclusive rights in land, but further distorts the context of the dispute in Brunz."). See generally, id. at 13-17 (concluding that the federal courts should have certified the underlying question to the Hawai'i Supreme Court for determination based upon the unique background principles of property law that apply in this state).
1 0 See Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. County Planning Comm'n (PASH/Kohanaiki), 79 Hawai'i 425, 438, 440 & n.24, 903 P.2d 1246 Hawai'i 425, 438, 440 & n.24, 903 P.2d , 1259 Hawai'i 425, 438, 440 & n.24, 903 P.2d , 1261 Hawai'i 425, 438, 440 & n.24, 903 P.2d & n.24 (1995 Pele Defense Fund v. Paty (Pele 1), 73 Haw. 578,619, 837 P.2d 1247 , 1271 (1992 ), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1277 (1993 Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., Ltd., 66 Haw. 1, 12, 646 P.2d 745,752 (1982) ; see also Forman & Knight, supra note 27, at 7-8 (comparing the "insufficient basis" for the claim in Kalipi to the eventually successful assertion in Pele Defense Fund). Writing for the majority in Nakuapa I, Chief Justice Allen noted the "great difficulty in adjudicating" cases involving the ancient Hawaiian custom and usage of adoptions "after the lapse of so many years.""' Accordingly, he looked for guidance to four prior opinions. First, an unpublished decision that resolved a June 1856 claim in favor of a child adopted pursuant to Hawaiian custom and usage."' Then, three published decisions: In re Estate of Hakau," 3 Abenela v. Kailikole," 14 and Estate of His Majesty Kamehameha IV." 5 These opinions were deemed to be particularly persuasive because:
Chief Justice Lee and Mr. Justice Robertson... were familiar with the people, and their experience on the Land Commission, and their examinations of cases touching native rights, enabled them to form very correct opinions on all questions involving Hawaiian usages and customs.
.'. Nakuapa 1, 3 Haw. at 343.
12 See id. at 344 (recounting a court order that half of the decedent's estate be given to his wife's brother's son, based upon evidence that the child lived with the couple following his adoption before a tax collector, and before the child left for the seminary).
113 1 Haw. 263 (1856), cited in Nakuapa 1, 3 Haw. at 344. This is the first published case in Hawai'i to examine the distinction between keiki hinai and keiki ho'okama (although the opinion does not actually mention these two terms). Pursuant to "a statute regulating the descent of property, passed in 1850," the court held that a putative male heir unrelated to the decedent does not inherit from the decedent's estate absent evidence of a formal adoption or intent that the adopted child share in the deceased's property. Id. at 263-64. However, the facts showed that the child was "merely connected in some way with her first husband" despite having lived with the decedent's family "for a great length of time." Id. at 264. The court nevertheless advised that if the putative heir had been legally adopted, "he would have been sole heir to her estate, upon her dying intestate." Id.
14 2 Haw. 660,661-62 (1863) (dismissing ejectment action brought by the purported hdnai son of former landowners "in the absence of the necessary legal evidence of his having been adopted, as alleged"-i.e., that the plaintiff was a keiki ho'okama under Hawaiian usage and custom), cited in Nakuapa 1, 3 Haw. at 344-45. The Abenela court discredited claims relating to a purported written agreement between the plaintiff's uncle and aunt-i.e., the former landowners, with whom he lived for several years-and the plaintiff's father, which some witnesses claimed had been signed in the presence of a magistrate although it was not produced at trial. Id. (citing a statute enacted in 1846-i.e., before the transaction that took place sometime after the plaintiff's uncle became ill in 1847, and later died in 1848-which rendered the agreement void, in any event, for failure to record the document with a Notary Public). In other words, the only evidence presented did not relate to claims based upon Hawaiian usage or custom. Curiously, however, there is no substantive discussion of the defendant's right of possession to the land in question beyond an observation that it "has been in the possession of the defendant for a number of years." Id. at 661 (emphasis added).
... 2 Haw. 715,726 (1864) (acknowledging the right of Kamehameha M's adopted son to inherit his private lands not otherwise devised, subject to dower-consistent with both the king's will and the relevant statutory provision), cited in Nakuapa 1, 3 Haw. at 345; see also id. at 718 (conceding the need to consider Hawaiian history and custom). Hawai'i Law Review / Vol. 30:319 This question must be decided upon our own usages and customs, and written laws, and none other.' 16 Following remand to the probate court (Justice Widemann presiding), the jury rendered a verdict against Kaaoaopa." 7 On appeal in In re Estate of Nakuapa (Nakuapa II), Chief Justice Allen, Justice Hartwell, and Justice Widemann unanimously granted Kaaoaopa's motion for a new trial because the probate court erroneously admitted an unverified statement by King Kamehameha that Kaaoaopa in fact had no claim as keiki hanai, explaining that she did not have notice and an opportunity to present cross-interrogatories in connection with the statement taken from the King.'
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18 After a third trial, four years after Chief Justice Allen initially rejected Kaaoaopa's claims in 1869, the same three justices ruled against Kaaoaopa in Estate of Nakuapa (Nakuapa III)." 9 Writing for the majority, Justice Widemann discredited testimony from two specific witnesses in support of Kaaoaopa's claims, 20 as well as other evidence submitted in her favor.' In his concurring opinion, Justice Hartwell likewise discredited testimony concerning alleged references to Kaaoaopa by her adoptive parents as their "hooilina"-i.e., heir or devisee.' 22 Instead, Justice Hartwell chose to credit testimony admitted over Kaaoaopa' s "negative hearsay" objection, that "many persons connected by blood and marriage, or on intimate terms with the parties... had never been aware of the child's adoption as heir, or that she was regarded by the adopters as their heir."' 23 Finally, Chief Justice Allen concurred by simply reiterating his original decision as probate judge and stating his agreement with his colleagues' description of the testimony.' 24 116 Nakuapa 1, 3 Haw. at 345 (emphasis added). "' In re Estate of Nakuapa (Nakuapa I), 3 Haw. 400,400 (1872). 18 Id. at401, 402-03, 406. "9 3 Haw. 410 (1873) . 120 Id. at 412-13 ("Kapu ... states that both Puhalahua and Nakuapa, at the time of the adoption, declared that they adopted claimant as their heir.... Had the witness given this evidence at the first hearing, it would have carried great weight; its coming at this late day materially detracts from its weight."). Justice Widemann observed that another witness' vague recollections about the circumstances under which Kaaoaopa's adoptive parents purportedly told him about the adoption conflicted with Kapu's testimony. Id. at 412 (dismissing Kukahiko's testimony because Kapu presumably would have had the best recollection, despite having already concluded that Kapu's testimony was unreliable).
.. 1 Id. (acknowledging that Kaaoaopa's adoptive parents repeatedly referred to her as kaikamahine hanai-i.e., adopted daughter-and that Nakuapa "frequently held out hopes of inheritance"; but declining to infer that it was a "foregone conclusion" Kaaoaopa would actually be given that right).
122 Id. at 414 (Hartwell, J., concurring). 123 Id. at 414-15. 124 Id. at 416 (Allen, J., concurring) ("I see no reason, from any additional testimony introduced in the subsequent hearings, to change my opinion[.]").
Thus, after giving lip service to the difficulties that the justices' own errors caused for Kaaoaopa,' 25 the Court ultimately chose to weigh the conflicting evidence against her (and in favor of other, seemingly-interested parties).
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Nakuapa I nevertheless provided an important foundation for the concise recognition of Hawaiian usage by these same three justices a mere four months later in Kiaiaina. 27 The differing contexts provided in these decisions further highlight the necessity of analyzing claims involving Hawaiian custom and usage on a case-by-case basis.
C. The Passage of Time and Evolving Language Practices Have Not Diminished the Continuing Relevance of Hawaiian Usage in This State
Following annexation of these islands to the United States, an early attempt to undermine the Court's prior recognition of Hawaiian usage (not long after annexation of these islands to the United States)1 28 did not prevent the 125 In re Estate of Nakuapa (Nakuapa If), 3 Haw. 400, 406 (1872) ("The delay of another trial is to be regretted, since evidence in this class of cases daily becomes more difficult to find, as aged witnesses die."). Haw. 206, 209-11 (1900) (affirming lower court judgment that a legally adopted child is not entitled to inherit from his adoptive mother, after characterizing contrary language in Hakau, Abenela and Kamehameha IV as dicta, and further suggesting that Kiaiaina "simply followed the decision in [Nakuapa 1]") . The court appears to have given undue weight to Justice Hartwell's dissenting opinion in Nakuapa I based upon a misinterpretation of the court's earlier decision in In re Estate ofMaughan, 3 Haw. 262 (1871) .
In re Estate of Wilhelm mistakenly characterizes the plurality opinion in Maughan as having decided the question of Hawaiian usage adversely to claims by legally adopted persons seeking recognition of their rights as heirs. Id. Justice Hartwell's opinion in Maughan acknowledges that the putative heir did not make any allegations based on custom, then suggests that even "if alleged, it could have no force in the face of explicit statute provisions." 3 Haw. at 268. Justice Hartwell's colleagues apparently did not share this conclusion.
Justice Widemann's concurrence in Maughan relies on the absence of any evidence concerning the adopter's intentions beyond the written articles of adoption. Id. at 270 (rejecting claim of adopted child in favor of the decedent's sister). Chief Justice Allen's dissent in Maughan (albeit presented at the start of the opinion) counters that "adopted child" (i.e., keiki ho'okama) is legally synonymous with "child" under Hawaiian usage and custom, adding that neither the decedent nor the legislature could have intended that a child formally adopted as her own should be left "houseless and homeless" the moment her adoptive mother died. Id. at 264; see also O'Brien, 35 Haw. 104, 121-22 (1939) ("The statements were uncontradicted by the majority opinion which confined its decision to the written agreement before it and the recognition made in the dissenting opinion is in harmony with a later finding of the supreme court [presumably Kiaiaina] upon evidence before it.").
Wilhelm further misstates the law by suggesting that the As adoption under the statute replaced ancient Hawaiian custom and usage, the term ho'okama has fallen into disuse and the term hanai has since been used to refer to all types of adoption. Nevertheless the custom of giving children to grandparents, near relatives, and friends to raise whether legally or informally remains a strong one.
3 2
Moreover, in Young v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 133 the Hawai'i Supreme Court later acknowledged the continuing vitality of Hawaiian custom and usage with respect to adoptions-more specifically, the distinction "between a person legally adopted, a 'hookama' and a person merely cared for, a 'hanai."" ' Indeed, the Young court expressly refused to water down this distinction under the circumstances presented in that case. named Achu prevailed against his Hawaiian wife and adopted daughter based on the specific terms of a will devising only a portion of his estate to the latter family (including real estate already owned by his Hawaiian wife "in her own right"). 493, 495 . See also Maughan, 3 Haw. at 269 ("In the Ah Chu [sic] case, there was a will."). An on-line search failed to uncover any published decision involving a person named "Ah Chu"; thus, it appears that the court in Maughan may have been referring to prior proceedings concerning the decedent referred to as "Achu" in the Wei Sei decision subsequently published in 1873.
" See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text. 30 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text, and notes 81, 107, 112.
'3' 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974) . 3 Id. at 411, 520 P.2d at 766 (emphasis added). The court reversed an order granting summary judgment against plaintiff seeking damages for mental distress suffered when he observed defendant strike and kill plaintiff's step-grandmother with defendant's automobile. See id. at 399, 412, 520 P.2d at 760, 767 (concluding that the plaintiff should be permitted to prove his relationship with his step-grandmother despite the absence of a blood relationship).
" ' 67 Haw. 544, 697 P.2d 40 (1985) (affirming summary judgment against the estate of a person who died in an automobile accident despite claim that decedent Homer Young should be covered as a "relative" under Kenneth Kekumu's insurance policy because decedent and insured regarded each other as father and son).
"
Id. at 547, 544 P.2d at 42 (citing O'Brien v. Walker, 35 Haw. 104, 118-19 (1939) ); see also Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 66 Haw. 1, 10, 646 P.2d 745, 751 (1982) (citing O'Brien for the proposition that the Hawaiian usage exception under H.R.S. section 1-1 continues to protect "native understandings and practices which did not unreasonably interfere with the spirit of the common law"). 33 The relevant provision in Kekumu's insurance policy covered him, his spouse and their respective relatives "while residents of his household." Young, 67 Haw. at 546,697 P.2d at 41. Homer's mother claimed he was hinai to Kekumu, with whom she had lived in the house for eighteen years and regarded as her husband (just as Kekumu regarded her as his wife). Id. at It may seem strange at first blush that a Hawaiian custom or usage of inheritance could have developed prior to the establishment of private property rights. 3 6 However, history reveals that a limited right of inheritance existed subject to modification or dispossession by decree.' 37 As explained by Professor Lilikal Kame'eleihiwa, "one of the early examples of hereditary succession" can be traced back "about ten generations before Kamehameha.' 3 8 In any event, Hawai'i law expressly contemplates the development of customs and traditions prior to November 25, 1892.139 Thus, as of 1871, the Supreme Court of the Kingdom of Hawaii recognized a custom and usage of inheritance by lawfully adopted children (i.e., keiki ho'okama).14°G iven the context discussed above, the views expressed by kumu hula Hewett 4 ' and Judge Ezra' 4 2 are understandable but misplaced. Even if it were established that Brayden Mohica-Cummings possesses inheritance rights as the issue of his grandfather's keiki ho 'okama, such facts would not necessarily confer rights upon him as an intended third-party beneficiary of Pauahi's will.
V. MAIAMA PONO: HAWAIIAN CUSTOM AND USAGE AS FURTHER CONTEXT TO SUPPORT PAUAHI'S INTENT
United States District Judge Alan C. Kay summarized the "exceptionally unique historical circumstances" that surround Kamehameha Schools' admissions policy granting a preference to Native Hawaiians. "' In doing so, he revealed crucial context for the policy by determining that Bernice Pauahi 545-46,697 P.2d at 41. When Homer moved in with Kekumu and his mother eight years before the accident, he was over thirty years of age but had already known the insured "for several years" before then. Id. at 545, 697 P.2d at 41.
136 See, e.g., Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. County Planning Comm'n (PASH/Kohanaiki), 79 Hawai'i 425, 442-51, 903 P.2d 1246 , 1263 -72 (1995 . The refusal of foreigners to recognize Hawaiian custom and usage with respect to land management beginning after 1820 led to adoption of the Kingdom's first Constitution in 1840 and the Miihele of 1848, in an effort to preserve its "'political existence."' Id. at 444, 903 P.2d at 1265.
" ' Keelikolani v. Robinson, 2 Haw. 514,515-17,518-20 (1862) ; see also KAME'ELEIHWA, supra note 75, at 51-64 (Chapter 3, "Kalai'aina: The Politics of Traditional Land Tenure"); id. at 95-135 (Chapter 5, "Inheritance Patterns Among Ali'i Nui Prior to 1848").
